How much 'Soft Power' does China have in Africa?
Helge Rønning I have over the past years been intrigued by why Chinese scholars and policy makers have found the term 'soft power' 1 so useful. Can it have something to with its loose connotations, and that it one the hand signifies power, and on the other hand does not really do so? It is an oxymoron, and thus an efficient rhetorical figure, but does it serve as a good description of what the Chinese going-out policy implies? Soft power is but one and not such an important element of the tri-annual FOCAC meetings 2 between Chinese and African political leaders.
The concept of 'soft power' has become a hot topic in Chinese policy debates as well as in academic analyses. 3 This is linked to different perceptions of China's increasing strength economically and rising influence in international relations, as well as the growing interest in the Chinese development model in Africa. There is a clear awareness in China that the country must present an image to the world that is related to more than economic power and political and military ambitions.
There seems to be two dominant Chinese ways of analyzing the role of 'soft power' in Chinese politics. One school of thought is centered on culture in a wide sense of the word as the most important element in soft power initiatives. This leads to another quite odd concept, namely 'cultural soft power', which of course is a pleonasm. The other approach is wider and seems to more clearly emphasize political elements that among others include a promotion of the Chinese model of development as well as Chinese participation in multilateral diplomacy, overseas aid programs, involvement in peace-keeping and conflict solution. The focus of this way of thinking is on how 'soft power' initiatives are linked to state policies.
The Image of China
China's development assistance to Africa, which takes many formsloans and direct economic support, health, agriculture, education, training, academic, infrastructure construction, culture, and media -is an important element of the general Chinese engagement with Africa. Some of these projects are linked to economic investments; others have the form of direct assistance. Aid is growing but the Chinese development assistance to Africa is still much below what traditional donors provide. And it will remain so in the foreseeable future. It should be mentioned that it is not easy to acquire reliable statistics of the aid provided by China, because aid figures remain a state secret and only a minimum of information is provided. However, it should be borne in mind that Chinese assistance at times is more grass-root oriented than aid provided by other donors. It is also more directly aimed at governments, and it does not involve NGOs. It is also clear that aid is a tool of China's foreign policy, but this is also the case for other donor countries. 4 Thus development assistance is an essential element of the Chinese soft engagement in Africa. It is politics, but it is also ideology. In the perspective of a combination between political, ideological and military power it should be mentioned that Chinese troops as of June 2013 took part in the peacekeeping mission in Mali, as well as in peace keeping initiatives in South Sudan in 2014.
The principal source of China's increasingly positive image in Africa is linked to economic engagements of many kinds -not only mega-projects and investments in extractive industries, construction, infrastructure, and finance.
But also small and medium scale Chinese economic presence in trade, agriculture contribute to the image of a partner who sees Africa as a continent of the future, and did so also at the time when the image in the West of Africa was "The Hopeless Continent" as was the infamous cover story of an issue of
The Economist in 2000. 5 The radical rise in trade between China and Africa is obviously an economic power element, but it also contributes to strengthening the ideological and political power of China. China's trade with and investments in Africa are growing, and was in 2014 in the process of overtaking EU and US. In 2013 the trade stood at over US $170 billion. 6 In an article from 2013 7 The Economist reported that a growing number of Africans thought that the Chinese created jobs, transferred skills and spent money in local economies. A BBC poll 8 (CRCC) built the line and plans are that it will later be linked to the TAZARA railway between Zambia and Tanzania that China constructed in the 1970s.
9 Once the Angolan railway loan had been negotiated and approved Chinese companies started undertaking the work, bringing its own materials, equipment and quite a few workers, particularly foremen. 10 There are many infra structure projects of the same kind all over the continent. A more recent and less spectacular example is the construction of the new presidential offices in Maputo. They were inaugurated on 24 January StarTimes has a three-tier subscription system in Africa consisting of three bouquets. The prices per month differ from country to country, but in 2013 it was for instance in Uganda UGX 30,000 for the basic bouquet (36 channels) UGX 33,000 for the classic bouquet (46 channels) and UGX 60,000
for the Unique bouquet (51 channels). The package use has been estimated for the whole continent in the following manner: 85 percent of the subscribers use the basic bouquet, 10 percent the classic, and 5 percent the unique bouquet. Thus it seems that StarTimes appeals to the lower income tiers of audiences. This is further indicated by that the subscription fees for StarTimes in general are lower than for its competitors such as MultiChoice, DStv. It has also benefitted from privileged agreements with governments. At the moment StarTimes has businesses in 23 different African countries, and currently has network operations in 12 countries in relation to the migration from analogue to digital.
African headquarters of 20.000 square meters in Nairobi, which would serve as a center for TV and film production and distribution on the continent. One of the main tasks of the center would be to dub its productions to African languages. It would also house a digital TV research and developments center.
The center is aimed at fulfilling the demands from steadily more African countries for increased local contents. This is among others the case in Kenya where the goal for its radio and TV stations is to fulfill a quota of at least two thirds local content. The plans for the center are also linked to plans to introduce more Chinese programs to the continent. However in April 2014 StarTimes won back the contract after it had been readvertised. The company has also been criticized for selling out dated first generation decoders DVB-T, instead of the adopted second generation DVB-T2 decoders in countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. StartTimes is an example of the wielding of economic with political and economic power. As it serves as a conduit for Chinese media StarTimes also has considerable ideological and symbolic power. While it is clear that it takes time to build a stable audience, it is also a question whether CCTV has been able to penetrate the African market for news. The studies that have been done of TV audiences in Kenya show that for instance for the period April -June 2013 CCTV had not reached any significant audience in the country. It did not figure among the ten most popular channels, where the smallest had only 1 percent. 16 Now it may be a consolation for CCTV that none of the other international channels figured on the list. There has been a very limited and preliminary study done of how CCTV is being perceived, and it showed that some viewers from the very narrow sample accessed the channel, and that they found it attractive. 17 It is also interesting to note that these were viewers who accessed digital TV on other set-top boxes than DStv, e.g. StarTimes. It is obviously too early to conclude whether African audiences have taken to CCTV as an important news source for the understanding of Africa and Chinese African relations, but there is on the other hand no doubt that the competition for audience attention and thus for cultural and ideological power in the area of TV is fierce.
CCTV is the prime example of Chinese media power in Africa. Its main role is to enter the power game about definitional power in relation to presenting a Chinese agenda for understanding Africa, China and international politics. The main adversaries in this struggle for gaining a foothold among African audiences are obviously the big international news broadcasters CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, but also African channels.
The Narrative of the Search for 'Soft Power'
In an attempt to assess how much 'soft power' China really possesses, and whether the term lends itself to understanding China's communications, media and public diplomacy, I propose an actantial analysis. It builds on the narratological theories of A. J. Greimas. 18 Originally it was launched as a model for understanding structures of narratives in literature. It is, however, also useful as a way into the role of different forms of power understood as narratives. The point of departure for this model is that all stories can be structured according to three actantial oppositions, which each form the axes of the narrative. The first is called the axis of desire, which has two components -a subject and an object. The subject desires the object. The second axis is one of power and the elements are helper(s) and opponent(s).
The helper (s) assists the subject in achieving the object of desire and the opponent(s) prevent the same from happening. The thirds axis is one of transmission and consists of sender(s) and receiver(s). The receiver is the element that initiates the quest. Sender elements are often also receiver elements. And subjects may function as receivers.
When we apply this analytical model to the narrative of China's desire for 'soft power', China is the subject, and the object is soft power. The recipient is Chinese influence and also its diverse forms of power aided by soft power initiatives. The sender is the Chinese government as well as cooperating African governments. China's helpers in this quest are many. The advantage of the previous colonial languages over Chinese is formidable.
Prestige buildings give China an edge, but also here there is competition.
Western military influence in Africa is far more powerful than China's. China also has a negative public image to overcome linked to illegal activities in poaching and illegal logging and perceived corruption. The lack of democracy and inability to cooperate with civil society also contribute to a Chinese Nevertheless much of it is underpinned by conspicuous and consistent state support, and thus it also part of a wider power strategy as outlined above. It involves clear decisions that must be seen as part and parcel of the Chinese multi-layered strategy in relation to building political influence and support for its foreign policy strategies; acquiring raw materials and building a strong economic presence in Africa -soft loans; large-scale construction projects in the form of infrastructure -roads and railways, and prestige buildingsnational stadia, parliaments, presidential offices; aid initiatives -health programs; cultural and educational policies -Confucius institutes.
Investments in communications industries represent a kind of straddling between economic and ideological engagements. Now these ventures are in no way comparable to the ideological hegemony wielded by
Western media in Africa, they are, however, indications of that the struggle over ideological interpretations is heating up.
Ideologically China has had some influence through its development model and as a provider of aid. But when it comes to knowledge of Chinese ways of life and culture the influence is minimal. This has partly to do with the language issue, but also that popular culture from the US, the former colonial powers, Brazil and India have much more influence than Chinese attempts to enter this arena. As a curious apropos was that on January 28, 2014, BBC reported that there was a state sponsored initiative to promote China's This model serves as an important agenda setter for development strategy debates. But it has a serious democratic and human rights deficit, which weakens its ideological appeal.
As regards economic power there is no doubt about the Chinese importance in Africa as well as the rest of the world. But there is still a long way to go before China wields the "soft power" in Africa so many Chinese politicians and academics foresee.
